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Morgan: The Rise of Institutional Law Practice

THE RISE OF INSTITUTIONAL LAW PRACTICE
Thomas D. Morgan*
For generations, the legal profession has assumed that only
individual lawyers practice law. Ethical standards have been largely, if
not exclusively, directed at individuals, and practice organizations have
been regulated to prevent limiting individual lawyer professional
judgment. The world in which lawyers now practice makes the
individualized model obsolete. The complexity of modern law narrows
the breadth of any individual lawyer's practice and makes law firms and
other practice organizations inevitable. Firms, in turn, must maintain
both ethical compliance and a high level of service quality that is
inconsistent with lawyers behaving idiosyncratically. This Article
explores these developments and suggests changes in the rules
governing lawyer conduct needed to respond to the possibilities and
problems the developments create.

I. THE VIEW THAT LAW IS PRACTICED ONLY BY INDIVIDUALS
For over eight hundred years,' the term "lawyer" was a description
of a person's status in the world. Initially, lawyers were literally
"officers of the court" who accompanied the king and later the royal

* Oppenheim Professor of Antitrust and Trade Regulation Law, The George Washington
University Law School. This Article is based on the Lichtenstein Lecture presented at the Maurice
A. Deane School of Law at Hofstra University on February 1, 2012.
1. The usual date for the origin of the legal profession is the late twelfth century, during the
reign in England of Henry II. See THOMAS D. MORGAN, THE VANISHING AMERICAN LAWYER 29
(2010). For an introduction to the development of the modem profession over the centuries, see
generally PAUL BRAND, THE ORIGINS OF THE ENGLISH LEGAL PROFESSION (1992) (discussing the
early history of the English legal profession); Carol Rice Andrews, Standards of Conduct for
Lawyers: An 800-Year Evolution, 57 SMU L. REV. 1385 (2004) (discussing the history and
evolution of legal ethical standards); Judith L. Maute, Alice's Adventures in Wonderland:
PreliminaryReflections on the History of the Split English Legal Profession and the Fusion Debate
(1000-1900 A.D.), 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1357 (2003) (discussing the development of the bifurcated
English legal profession); Jonathan Rose, The Legal Profession in Medieval England: A History of
Regulation, 48 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1 (1998) (discussing the history of the legal profession in
medieval England).
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judges from town to town to resolve disputes. 2 Ultimately, lawyer roles
became more diverse and more focused on representation of private
interests, 3 but in all cases, a person was trained and admitted to lawyer
status by more senior members of the legal profession.4 A set of
activities were then defined as the "practice of law" and reserved to
those who had a license to practice.5 In effect, the legal profession
became a secular, self-perpetuating 6priesthood to which people had to
turn at important times in their lives.
Traditionally, lawyer-client relationships were seen as personalbetween one lawyer and his or her client. Until the middle of the
twentieth century, a majority of American lawyers were solo
practitioners, and some remain so today.7 And while American lawyers
have never been prohibited from forming firms, throughout most of the
country's history, firms tended to be small.8 As recently as 1960, fewer
than forty U.S. law firms had more than fifty lawyers each, 9 and even in
1968, only twenty firms had more than one-hundred lawyers.' 0
But then too, even "large" firms were understood to be aggregations
of individual lawyers, not free-standing organizational entities."1 Indeed,
lawyers have strenuously resisted the idea that institutions-for example,
corporations, banks, or insurance companies-may provide legal
services.2 In-house legal departments may handle a company's own
legal matters, but those in-house lawyers have not been permitted to

2.

See BRAND, supra note 1, at 14-16; MORGAN, supra note 1, at 185.

3. BRAND, supra note i, at43,45.
4. See id at 106-19 (discussing training and entry into the early English legal profession
through apprenticeships).
5. See Andrews, supra note 1, at 1407; Grace M. Giesel, Corporations Practicing Law
Through Lawyers: Why the UnauthorizedPracticeof Law Doctrine Should Not Apply, 65 Mo. L.

REv. 151, 160, 165-67 (2000).
6. BRAND, supranote 1, at 32 (discussing how the changes to the legal environment resulted
in a demand for legal services).
7. See, e.g., RICHARD L, ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS 298 tbl.37a, 300 tbl.37c (1989). The
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics reports that twenty-two percent of American lawyers are "selfemployed," a figure that includes partners in law firms as well as solo practitioners. U.S. Bureau of
Labor Statistics, Lawyers, OCCUPATIONAL OUTLOOK HANDBOOK, 2012-13 EDITION (Mar. 29,
2010), http://www.bls.gov/ooh/legal/lawyers.htm (follow "Work Environment" hyperlink).
8. See Marc Galanter & Thomas M. Palay, Why the Big Get Bigger: The Promotion-toPartnerTournamentand the Growth of Large Law Firms, 76 VA. L. REv. 747, 749 (1990).
9. MARC GALANTER & THOMAS PALAY, TOURNAMENT OF LAWYERS: THE
TRANSFORMATION OF THE BIG LAW FIRM 22 (1991); Galanter & Palay, supra note 8, at 749.
10. ROBERT L. NELSON, PARTNERS WITH POWER: THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE
LARGE LAW FIRM 2 (1988) (citing ERWIN 0. SMIGEL, THE WALL STREET LAWYER: PROFESSIONAL
ORGANIZATION MAN? 359 (2d prtg. 1973)).
11. GALANTER & PALAY, supra note 9, at 13.
12. See Giesel, supra note 5, at 172.
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represent a business's customers or other third parties.13 As the Supreme
Court of Errors of Connecticut explained: "The practice of law is open
only to individuals proved to the satisfaction of the court to possess
sufficient general knowledge and adequate special qualifications as to
learning in the law and to be of good moral character.... Only a human
being can conform to these exacting requirements."' 4
That view of law practice as an activity exclusively of individual
lawyers largely explains why the American Bar Association ("ABA")
Model Rules of Professional Conduct (the "Model Rules") 5 continue to
regulate the individual lawyers in law firms but not firms themselves. 6
An American law firm may enter into contracts as an entity and be
civilly liable as an entity for torts committed by firm members in the
course of their practice,17 but ordinarily, such a law firm will not itself be
subject to professional discipline.' Instead, the Model Rules impose
personal duties on law firm managers to establish rules designed to help
assure that individual firm lawyers and non-lawyers adhere to the
standards of lawyer conduct.' 9
When asked to let insurance companies use their employed
attorneys to represent policyholders contractually entitled to defense
services, the Supreme Court of Kentucky refused to change the state rule
against such corporate provision of legal services by resorting to the
"age-old adage of 'if it ain't broke, don't fix it." '' 20 What I am in effect

saying in this Article is that the system is indeed broken--or at least
obsolete-and it is time to fix it.

13. See id. at 175. Issues relating to the corporate practice of law come up most frequently
these days in the context of insurance companies trying to assign their employed lawyers to
represent the company's policyholders instead of retaining lawyers from local law firms. See
Charles Silver, FlatFees and Staff Attorneys: Unnecessary Casualtiesin the ContinuingBattle over
the Law Governing InsuranceDefense Lawyers, 4 CONN. INS. L.J, 205, 243-44 (1997).
14. State Bar Ass'n of Conn. v. Conn. Bank & Trust Co., 140 A.2d 863, 870 (Conn. 1958).
15.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT (2011).

16. Seeid.R. 5.1,5.3.
17. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 58 (2000).
18. See id. § 5. Two important exceptions are New Jersey and New York, which have
accepted the idea of imposing discipline on law firms. N.J. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.1
(1984); N.Y. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.1, 5.3 (2009).
19.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.1, 5.3.

20. Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Ky. Bar Ass'n, 917 S.W.2d 568, 569, 571 (Ky. 1996); see also Gardner
v. N.C. State Bar, 341 S.E.2d 517, 518 (N.C. 1986). But see Gafcon, Inc. v. Ponsor & Assocs., 120
Ca. Rptr. 2d 392, 397 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (holding that an insurance company does not engage in
the practice of law when an insurer's attorney defends its insured against a third party claim); In re
Allstate Ins. Co., 722 S.W.2d 947, 948, 950-53 (Mo. 1987) (en bane) (rejecting Gardner and
holding that an insurance company's attorney can defend its insured in civil litigation).
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WHAT HAS CHANGED ABOUT THE NATURE OF LAWYER PRACTICE?

Over the last forty years, protecting a lawyer's status as an
individual professional seemed important to lawyers, but I would
suggest that to the rest of the American public, the practical definition of
a lawyer's professional success has become what the lawyer can help a
client accomplish and what trouble the lawyer can help a client avoid.21
Today, few lawyers act alone. 22 They act primarily as members of teams,
often only some of whose members are lawyers. 23
What I am calling the "rise of institutional law practice" is the
multi-person provision of legal services through organizations, ranging
from traditional law firms to corporate legal departments, legal aid
offices, prosecutorial and other government agencies, and even entities
that develop technology designed to simplify client self-representation.
In my book, The Vanishing American Lawyer, I explain some of the
reasons for this transformation in the way legal services are delivered,
and I will summarize the most important here. 24
First, the law has become far more complex over the last forty
years. 25 Even neighborhood lawyers face issues of multistate, as well as
international, dimensions.2 6 Clients involved in global commerce hire or
send employees all over the country and the world.27 Those employees
create various financial issues that did not exist for previous generations
of lawyers.2 8 Even the ablest of lawyers cannot be experts in all law
everywhere, so the scope of individual lawyer practice fields has
inevitably narrowed.2 9 A lawyer who continues to try to be a general
practitioner focusing on local subjects that she studied for the bar exam
will neither serve her clients well nor retain most of her clients long. 3°
Second, the number of people with legal training has exploded over
the last forty years.3 1 In 1970, America had about 300,000 licensed
lawyers. 32 Interest in going to law school-fueled both by a sense that
being a lawyer was a way to make a difference in the world and an
increased interest in lawyering among women and members of minority
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

See MORGAN, supra note 1, at 7-8.
Id. at 101,149.
Id. at 125, 149.
See id at ch. 3.
See id. at ch. 3.C.
See id. at 89-90.
ld. at 89.
Id.
See id. at 89, 147.
See id. at 129-31.
See id. at 80-81.
Id. at 81 & n.32.
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groups-did not slow until very recently.3 3 Today we have about 1.2
34
million licensed lawyers, of whom about one million are in practice.
Given those kinds of numbers, no individual lawyer can rely on simply
having a law license to assure a successful practice. The gap between the
number of available lawyers trying to practice and the number of clients
with the means to pay for legal help has widened sharply in recent
years. 35 Basically, the growth in the demand for lawyers tends to track
growth in the nation's gross domestic product ("GDP"). 36 American law
schools increase the number of available lawyers at a rate exceeding four
percent each year, while since 2008, the GDP has increased at an annual
rate less than four percent.37 It should be no surprise that graduates find
it hard to get jobs and that experienced lawyers must find a field of law
in which they stand out as significantly better than their clients' other
choices.38
Third, in a world where lawyers must develop a field of expertise in
which they can stand out as unique, a lawyer will do well only so long as
his or her expertise is widely needed.39 If client needs change, able
lawyers in declining fields will face problems. Professors Ronald Gilson
and Robert Mnookin have argued that lawyers form private law firms in
part to diversify the economic risk lawyers face at different stages of a
business cycle. 40 Bankruptcy lawyers are busy today, for example, and
33. Id. at 80.
34. Id. at 81 & n.32.
35. See id. at 63-64; Thomas D. Morgan, Economic Reality Facing 21st Century Lawyers, 69
WASH. L. REv. 625, 631 (1994) [hereinafter Morgan, Economic Reality].
36. MORGAN, supra note 1, at 81; Morgan, Economic Reality, supra note 35, at 627; B. Peter
Pashigian, The Marketfor Lawyers: The Determinants of the Demandfor and Supply ofLawyers, 20
J.L. & ECON. 53,73 (1977).
37. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) Graph, U.S. BUREAU OF ECON. ANALYSIS,
http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/nationa/gdp/gdpglance.htm (last modified Mar. 29, 2012). Put
another way, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics predicts a ten percent increase in the demand for
lawyers over the next decade, while the nation's law schools will increase the supply of lawyers by
over forty percent. See U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, supra note 7.
38. See MORGAN, supra note 1, at 15, 81, 129-30.
39. Id. at 140.
40. Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Sharing Among the Human Capitalists: An
Economic Inquiry into the CorporateLaw Firm and How PartnersSplit Profits, 37 STAN. L. REV.
313, 322-29 (1985). The authors concluded that objectives such as economies of scale, the ability to
support specialists, and the ability to offer a range of services could be achieved by firms
significantly smaller than the firms then seen, much less the large firms found today. Id. at 316-18.
Professors Marc Galanter and Thomas Palay have proposed one of the principal competing theories
about the growth of law firms. GALANTER & PALAY, supra note 9, at 99-108. The authors argued
that to attract able young lawyers, firms had to offer a credible hope of partnership and that firms
grew as they created new partner positions for the most successful in the "promotion-to partner
tournament." Id. Professors Galanter and William Henderson later modified the "promotion-topartnership tournament" theory. See generally Marc Galanter & William Henderson, The Elastic
Tournament. A Second Transformation of the Big Law Firm, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1867 (2008).
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their transaction-oriented partners profit from their success. A booming
economy will let the transaction lawyers return the favor later. 4'
Fourth, being in a firm allows lawyers to expand the client services
they are able to provide.42 Individual lawyers must limit their practice to
few substantive areas in which they can stay fully informed.43 Groups of
professionals with multiple areas of interest can provide clients with a
greater range of legal services, sometimes called "one-stop-shopping,"
quite apart from the other advantages that a diverse range of practices
permits a firm to achieve. 44
Fifth, multi-lawyer organizations can also provide the great number
of employees that large clients require. 45 A firm can provide the bodies
needed to close a business deal or try a major lawsuit "that would

Galanter and Henderson explained:
[T]he large law firm sector has gradually moved from the classic promotion-to-partner
tournament, which was characterized by a fairly constant and reliable set of rules that
limited the options of associates and partners, to the elastic model, which promotes,
laterally hires, or de-equitizes partners in order to maximize profits for a proportionally
smaller equity class.
Id. More recently, scholars have recognized that the unbridled growth of large law firms is facing
serious problems. See, e.g., Bernard A. Burk & David McGowan, Big But Brittle: Economic
Perspectiveson the Futureof the Law Firm in the New Economy, 2011 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 6476 (discussing how reputations of individual firm members are more important than that of the firm
as a whole); Larry E. Ribstein, The Death of Big Law, 2010 Wis. L. REv. 749, 775, 760-61, 765-68
(discussing how alternative providers of legal services undercut the pyramid model on which many
firms have been based).
41. MORGAN, supra note 1, at 140-41. "Anyone who has followed the decline in loyalty to
firms and the seemingly endless moves some lawyers make from firm to firm" can see both the
reality of the risk-sharing explanation of law firms and the challenges it presents. See id. at 141. This
risk-sharing model, of course, carries with it certain implications, including that the lawyers may try
to: (1) "avoid working as hard as their partners [do] but [hope] to receive a full share of profits
anyway, a phenomenon called 'shirking'; (2) accept "support from their partners in their own lowdemand times but [sell themselves] to a different firm just as their skill becomes more valuable
('leaving')"; and (3) take good clients with them as they leave ("grabbing"). Id The ethical status of
these practices is explored in, for example, Robert W. Hillman, Law Firms and Their Partners: The
Law and Ethics of Grabbingand Leaving, 67 TEx. L. REv. 1, 8-20 (1988); Robert W. Hillman, The
Law Firm as Jurassic Park: Comments on Howard v. Babcock, 27 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 533, 543
(1994); Robert W. Hillman, The Property Wars of Law Firms: Of Client Lists, Trade Secrets and
the Fiduciary Duties of Law Partners, 30 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 767, 769, 776-77 (2003); see also
Milton C. Regan, Jr., Law Finns, Competition Penalties, and the Values of Professionalism, 13
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 1, 55-56 (1999) [hereinafter Regan, Jr., Law Firms] (discussing how
"immediate concerns about compensation and revenues" promote a culture of "grabbing," rather
than cooperation, within firms, and develop "control firm[s]" in which "relationships are held
together by fear and self-interest" and which "can undermine team production and" firm health
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
42. MORGAN, supra note 1, at 143.
43. Id. at 140, 143.
44. Id. at 143.
45. Id. at 142.
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overwhelm a solo practitioner or even an in-house legal department. 46
And when you think about it, this so-called "project work" can often
profitably involve non-lawyers as well as lawyers, a reality that pervades
much of modem law practice.47
These realities are as true for organizations serving individual
clients as they are for business lawyers. Many traditional legal services
for individuals will tend to be delivered as commodities, that is, as
standardized products sold primarily on the basis of price. 4 Technology,
for example, will allow many documents to be sold as forms or tailored
to individual needs using a few clicks of a computer mouse. 49 If a client
needs face-to-face advice for reassurance or needs to take a matter to
court, someone with legal training will become involved, but for the
kinds of work that many people with modest training can do quite well,
competition will tend to drive fees to levels far lower than those we see
today.5 °
Professor Jerry Van Hoy, who has studied the rise of the so-called
"franchise law firm," describes lawyers' work there as different than
most law schools teach--"more clerical and sales-oriented" than
"researching and solving legal problems. 5 1 On the other hand, even
commodity work is work some clients need done, and people who enjoy
developing ways to perform the work more efficiently for a high volume
of clients may thrive in the new environment.52 Increasingly, such work

46. Id.; George P. Baker & Rachel Parkin, The Changing Structure of the Legal Services
Industry and the Careers of Lawyers, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1635, 1656 (2006); Randall S. Thomas,
Stewart J. Schwab & Robert G. Hansen, Megafirms, 80 N.C. L. REv. 115, 127 (2001). Providers
such as Axiom Legal present an alternative way to staff large matters: they offer corporate legal
offices with individual lawyers who work on matters, sometimes from home. See John Turrettini,
De-Layering: Axiom Legal Eliminates an Expensive Middleman in Corporate Legal Work, FORBES,
July 26, 2004, at 136. In another development, Thomson Reuters has acquired Pangea3, one of the
largest outsourcing firms in India, and has hired U.S, lawyers to do outsourcing work for
corporations and law firms. Rachel M. Zahorsky, Vendor or Competitor?: Pangea3 Purchase
Pleases Some, Worries Others, A.B.A. J., Feb. 2011, at 27; About Us, PANGEA3,
http://www.pangea3.com/company-overview.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2012).
47. MORGAN, supra note 1, at 96-98, 142 (internal quotation marks omitted).
48. Id. at 95.
49. Id. at 95-96; see also Janson v. LegalZoom.com, Inc., 802 F. Supp. 2d 1053, 1054 (W.D.
Mo. 2011).
50. The leading case on writing books is N.Y. County Lawyers' Associationn v. Dacey, 283
N.Y.S.2d 984, 988-89, 1001 (App. Div.), rev'd, 21 N.Y.2d 694 (1967) (holding that the publication
of a book containing forms drafted and instructions on how to fill out the forms written by a layman
constituted the unlawful practice of law). But see In re Estate of Margow, 390 A.2d 591, 593, 597
(N.J. 1978) (holding that it was unlawful for a legal secretary to help an elderly friend rewrite her
will using the old will as a form).
51. See JERRY VAN HOY, FRANCHISE LAW FIRMS AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF PERSONAL
LEGAL SERVICES 2 (1997).

52. See id. at 18-19. Development of efficient techniques for delivering services will be of
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is being performed in a for-profit context as groups like LegalZoom.com
("LegalZoom") sell millions of dollars worth of documents, personalized
and prepared based on information entered into the clients' home
computers. 3 Law schools and other voluntary organizations might
produce checklists, packaged forms, and other guidance that would
allow at least some clients to do their own work. 4
III.

How SHOULD THE LAW RESPOND TO THESE DEVELOPMENTS?

The changes lawyers have faced over the last forty years are real,
and the question becomes: what changes in our thinking about lawyers
and lawyer regulation are necessary to deal with the new reality? We are
no longer a self-referential priesthood, and others can provide some or
all of the services that our clients need. What rules should apply to
lawyers and even non-lawyers now performing functions that lawyers
have traditionally performed and assumed? I believe at least four
changes in lawyer regulation are required to allow lawyers to deliver
services effectively now and in the future.
A. SanctioningPractice Organizations,Not JustIndividual Lawyers
First, while we should continue to require lawyers to individually
adhere to standards of integrity and confidentiality, conduct standards
also should be imposed on practice organizations themselves. This is not
a new proposal. Professor Ted Schneyer urged it over twenty years
ago, 55 and New York and New Jersey have adopted forms of the

particular importance in offices trying to deliver legal services to the poor. See id. at 19. The
profitability of efficiency may be an attraction. Id. at 20. Managing attorneys in franchised law
practices often share in the fees generated by the office. Id. at 31.
53. See Julee C. Fischer, Policing the Self-Help Legal Market: Consumer Protection or
Protection of the Legal Cartel?, 34 IND. L. REV. 121, 125 (2000); Andrea Chang, LegalZoom.com
Files to Raise up to $120 Million in IPO, L.A. TIMES (May 12, 2012),
http://articles.latimes.com/2012/may/12/business/la-fi-legalzoom-20120512. This work was recently
challenged as the unauthorized practice of law. Janson, 802 F. Supp. 2d at 1057-58. The challenge
was upheld based on the fact that non-lawyers were used to verify a document's completeness,
grammar, and consistency of the personalized information throughout the document. Id. at 1063-64.
News reports indicate that the company intends to continue operating in Missouri, albeit with
procedures tailored to meet the court's objections. Debra Cassens Weiss, LegalZoom Can Continue
to Offer Documents in Missouri Under ProposedSettlement, A.B.A. J. (Aug. 23, 2011, 7:32 AM),
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/legalzoom can-continue-to-offer-documents-in-missouri
_under.proposed settle/.
54. See, e.g., Fischer, supra note 53, at 124-25 (describing the burgeoning self-help market for
legal instruments). Translation of the documents into languages spoken by the clients will also
facilitate these developments. Id. at 143-44.
55. See Ted Schneyer, ProfessionalDisciplinefor Law Firms?, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 11
(1991) [hereinafter Schneyer, ProfessionalDiscipline].
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Schneyer proposal.5 6 But a large majority of jurisdictions have yet to
move in that direction, and the ABA has not seriously advanced
the idea.57
Regulating the conduct of practice organizations-not just
individual lawyers--continues to be an idea whose time should come.
Firm managers need an incentive to create a world in which lawyers
share responsibility, as well as benefits of each other's conduct. Today,
for example, lawyers are sometimes paid on an "eat-what-you-kill"
basis, that is, they are paid based on client matters they attract to the
firm.58 A world of decreased demand for lawyer services promises to be
one in which there will be competition within law firms, not just among
them.5 9 In an "eat-what-you-kill" system, a lawyer knows he will be paid
for fee-generating work he brings in,
but others will share the liability if
60
dishonest.
be
to
out
turns
client
the
The risk to firms who see themselves as only aggregations of their
members thus can be enormous. Clients, as well as lawyers, have a stake
in having professional standards that reinforce efforts of law firms to
establish a culture of ethical conduct by each of its lawyers and nonlawyers. Young lawyers learn quickly that their future in the firm
depends on how well they please their elders. 61 Everyone has a stake in
having firms preserve the value of the reputation that is a firm-wide
asset, and the challenge for managers will be to preserve that asset as
firms develop a less cohesive feel.62
Two examples may help provide some reality to the idea of
sanctioning organizations, not simply individuals. First, when
LegalZoom was charged with unauthorized practice, it was the
corporation that was charged, not the individual lawyers and non-

56.

See N.J. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.1 (1984); N.Y. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.

5.1, 5.3 (2009).
57. Ted Schneyer, On Further Reflection: How "Professional Self-Regulation" Should
Promote Compliance with Broad Ethical Duties of Law Firm Management, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 577,
611 (2011) [hereinafter Schneyer, On FurtherReflection].
58. Milton C. Regan, Jr., CorporateNorms and Contemporary Law Firm Practice, 70 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 931, 937 (2002) [hereinafter Regan, Jr., CorporateNorms] (internal quotation marks
omitted).
59. See id.
60. MORGAN, supra note 1, at 141-42 (internal quotation marks omited). A similar problem
arises when one lawyer wants the firm to undertake a representation that would create a conflict of
interest with another client attracted to the firm by a different lawyer. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. &
Ted Schneyer, Regulatory Controls on Large Law Firms:A ComparativePerspective, 44 ARIZ. L.
REV. 593, 602-03 (2002).
61. For a rich account of this phenomenon, see generally Kimberly Kirkland, Ethics in Large
Law Firms: The Principleof Pragmatism,35 U. MEM. L. REV. 631 (2005).
62. See MORGAN, supra note 1, at 145-46; Hazard, Jr. & Schneyer, supranote 60, at 605.
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lawyers who work there.63 Because it is a corporation, we have no
trouble seeing LegalZoom as an entity subject to such a charge, and what
I am advocating here is that we see law firms as entities in the same way.
Take another example: In Maples v. Thomas,64 recently decided by
the U.S. Supreme Court, two Sullivan & Cromwell associates worked
pro bono on a petition for post-conviction relief on behalf of an Alabama
prisoner sentenced to death.6 5 While the matter was awaiting decision in
the district court, each of the lawyers left the firm for other jobs.6 6
Neither withdrew as counsel for the prisoner. 67 The District Court denied
the petition, and the court clerk sent notice of the denial to the lawyers at
Sullivan & Cromwell-their old address.68 Someone in the firm's
mailroom noted on the envelope that the lawyers no longer worked there
and returned the notice to the court unopened.69
The time for appeal expired, and the question before the Supreme
Court was whether the Eleventh Circuit could hear the appeal anyway. 70
The Court held that it could because the lawyers had in effect abandoned
their client without his knowledge. 71 But for our purposes, what is
important is that during oral argument, Justice Scalia asked:
If we find that these lawyers did abandon their client, will there be
some sanction imposed on them by the bar? I often wonder,.., does
anything happen to the counsel who have been inadequate in a capital
case?... Have you ever heard of anything
happening to them? Other
72
than they're getting another capital case?
It is possible, of course, that the lawyers would be subject to
discipline under Model Rules 1.173 (competence), 1.374 (diligence), and
1. 75 (communication) for abandoning their client in this way,76 but my
argument is that Sullivan & Cromwell should also be held responsible.
The delivery of legal services includes the work of people in the
mailroom, not just the firm's lawyers. Lawyers at law firms come and

63.
64.

Janson v. LegalZoom.com, Inc., 802 F. Supp. 2d 1053, 1057 (W.D. Mo. 2011).
132 S. Ct. 912 (2012).

65.

Id. at 918-19.

66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. at 919.
Id.
Id. at919-20.
Id. at 920.

70.

Id. at 917.

71. Id.
72. Transcript of Oral Argument at 55, Maples v. Thomas, 132 S. Ct. 912 (2012) (No. 10-63).
73.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2011).

74. Id. R. 1.3,
75. Id. R. 1.4.
76. See, e.g., In re Wolfram, 847 P.2d 94, 96, 103 (Ariz. 1993).
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go, and firm clients should not be the victims of those departures. The
responsibility for seeing that its obligations to
firm itself should bear
77
firm clients are met.
Interestingly, part of the difficulty this proposal has had in getting
traction may be that not everyone applauds the rise of the institutional
practice of law. During the same period that law firms have grown
larger, corporate clients have grown as well, and some have come
crashing down after instances of outright fraud. Some critics seem to
have been tempted to conflate the growth of corporate law firms with
these financial irregularities.78 In part, they suggest that lawyers in large
organizations might be tempted to let a corporate model of "managing"
risk replace the sense of individual responsibility and character that
lawyers have been required to cultivate in the past.79
Examples of corporate and law firm excess are unanswerable, 80 but
the general case for linking corporate fraud to institutional law practice
seems weak. Every time there is a financial scandal or a financial crisis,
one can make the argument that lawyers should have been able to
prevent it. Lawyers must have gotten too close to their clients, we hear;
lawyers have higher moral standards than people in finance or other
business fields and should be expected to prevent misconduct. 8' I expect
most of us doubt that lawyers are morally superior, however, and in my
view, the financial scandals that occurred happened in spite of the failure
to fully acknowledge the institutional practice of law, not because of it.

77. A natural question that follows, of course, is what the sanction could or should be. It is
easy to disbar or suspend the license of a natural person; it is harder to imagine suspending a law
firm. It is not hard to think about censuring a firn, however, and in today's competitive
environment, even making a firn ineligible to take more pro bono cases could be a sanction firms
would seek to avoid. In any event, because Maples was a criminal case, the usual malpractice
remedy against a firm would be hard to pursue. Compare RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 53 cmt. b (2000), with id. § 53 cmt. d (commenting on the requisite
showings of proof for a civil litigant and criminal defendant in a malpractice claim). A majority of
jurisdictions require a criminal defendant pursuing a malpractice remedy to prove affirmatively that
he is innocent of the charges against him. Id. § 53 cmt. d.
78. Regan, Jr., CorporateNorms, supra note 58, at 938-39; William H. Simon, Wrongs of
Ignoranceand Ambiguity: Lawyer Responsibility for Collective Misconduct, 22 YALE J. ON REG. 1,
30-31 (2005).
79. Anthony V. Alfieri, The Fall of Legal Ethics and the Rise of Risk Management, 94 GEO.
L.J. 1909, 1939 (2006); Milton C. Regan, Jr., Risky Business, 94 GEO. L.J. 1957, 1962-63 (2006);
William H. Simon, The Ethics Teacher's Bittersweet Revenge: Virtue and Risk Management, 94
GEO. L.J. 1985, 1990-91 (2006).
80. See, e.g., Milton C. Regan, Jr., Taxes and Death. The Rise and Demise of an American
Law Firm, 52 STUDIES L. POL. & SOC'Y (SPECIAL ISSUE) 107, 117-20 (2010).
81. Bruce A. Green, The Disciplinary Restrictions on Multidisciplinary Practice: Their
Derivation, Their Development, and Some Implicationsfor the Core Values Debate, 84 MINN. L.
REv. 1115, 1146 (2000).
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Rather than the rise of risk management representing a decline in
lawyer standards, in my view, risk management is one of the
accomplishments of the modem legal profession. Far from trying simply
to "manage" risk, risk management has been an effort to establish
"institutional (i.e., firm or practice-wide) policies, procedures, or
82
systems... designed to minimize risk within the firm and its practice.,
As a result of organizations such as the Attorneys Liability Assurance
Society, other legal malpractice insurers, and the personal leadership of
people such as Robert O'Malley, Anthony Davis, and Robert Creamer,
firms have reexamined leadership structures, initiated new-matter review
procedures, and designated "general counsel" to receive confidential
reports and questions from lawyers concerned about what they are being
asked to do on behalf of a client.83 In spite of good risk management
programs, some lawyers do and will behave badly, but because of risk
management efforts, we can expect the number of such incidents to be
reduced.84
Thus, I remain convinced that legal services today and tomorrow
will tend to be delivered by institutions, not primarily individual
lawyers. I think we need to embrace the move toward institutional
practice, not decry it.85 We should retain Model Rule 5.2(a), 86 which
makes clear that, whatever the ethical responsibility of the firm, each
lawyer retains a personal responsibility to conform to the rules of
professional conduct,8 7 but firms themselves should be subject to
professional sanction as well.

82. Anthony E. Davis, Legal Ethics and Risk Management: Complementary Visions of
Lawyer Regulation, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 95, 99 (2008) [hereinafter Davis, Legal Ethics]; see
also Anthony E. Davis, ProfessionalLiability Insurersas Regulators of Law Practice,65 FORDHAM

L. REv. 209, 220-21 (1996).
83. See Davis, Legal Ethics, supra note 82, at 103-04.
84. See Anthony V. Alfieri, Big Law and Risk Management: Case Studies of Litigation,
Deals, andDiversity, 24 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 991, 1021 (2011).

85. Another objection might be that whenever lawyers try to regulate themselves, they will
tend to do so in a way that is ineffective and self-serving. See, e.g., Gillian K. Hadfield, Legal
Barriersto Innovation: The Growing Economic Cost of ProfessionalControl over CorporateLegal

Markets, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1689, 1719-20 (2008). This concern is also implicit in Schneyer, On
Further Reflection, supra note 57. Professor Schneyer argues that requirements of institutional
"ethical infrastructure" imposed in the new British and Australian regulatory systems may do more
to promote good firm behavior than will fear of punishment after the fact. Id.at 585, 623, 628
(internal quotation marks omitted).
86.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.2(a) (2011).

87. Id.
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B. Acknowledging the Role of Non-Lawyers in
DeliveringLegal Services
A second change in regulation should acknowledge the appropriate
role of non-lawyers in delivering many kinds of legal services. 88 It is
hard to deny that non-lawyers already do many kinds of work
traditionally and simultaneously done by lawyers. 89 Non-lawyers prepare
tax returns, for example. 90 They also legally give tax advice or negotiate
and argue cases before the Internal Revenue Service and the Tax Court. 9'
Similarly, non-lawyer patent agents prepare patent applications and
otherwise advocate on behalf of inventors before the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office. In each case, the non-lawyers are subject to
federal regulation of that practice that applies to lawyers and
non-lawyers alike.9 2
Further, the Model Rules already acknowledge that law firms may
provide services not traditionally considered legal services. 93 The critical
distinction made in current regulations, however, is that it is lawful for
lawyers to employ non-lawyers but not to become their partner if any of
the services would traditionally be viewed as practicing law. 94 That issue
of what work may be delegated to non-lawyers also raises all sorts of
practical problems,95 but it is surely a distinction without a difference
88. We tend to think of unauthorized practice rules as applying only to imposters who pretend
to do something beyond their expertise. See id at R. 5.5 cmt. 2. The rules restrict lawyers, however,
insofar as the lawyers: (1) act outside jurisdictions in which they are licensed; (2) help a non-lawyer
to do work lawyers have traditionally done; or (3) form a partnership with a non-lawyer, some of
whose activities involve what is traditionally considered to be the practice of law. Id. at R. 5.4, 5.5.
89. Professor Herbert M. Kritzer has done outstanding work on this topic for many years. See
generally Herbert M. Kritzer, The Future Role of "Law Workers ": Rethinking the Forms of Legal
Practice and the Scope of Legal Education, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 917 (2002). He calls such persons
"law workers" and sees them as examples of the kinds of people with whom lawyers are likely to
compete in the future. See HERBERT M. KRITZER, LEGAL ADVOCACY: LAWYERS AND NONLAWYERS
AT WORK 202 (1998); Kritzer, supra, at 920-21 (internal quotation marks omitted). Non-lawyers
have rarely done their assigned work in a way that has damaged an organization's clients. KRITZER,
supra, at 195; Kritzer, supra, at 921. Indeed, "it is not self-evident that professional certification or
supervision insures special competence." Deborah L. Rhode, Policing the ProfessionalMonopoly: A
Constitutionaland EmpiricalAnalysis of UnauthorizedPracticeProhibitions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1,
86 (1981); see also Thomas D. Morgan, ProfessionalMalpractice in a World of Amateurs, 40 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 891, 898-99 (2009).
90. Indeed, the practice is so well-recognized that Congress has created an accountant-client
evidentiary privilege. I.R.C. § 7525(a)(1) (2006).
91. See KRITZER, supra note 89, at 11; Kritzer, supra note 89, at 920 n. 13.
92. See, e.g., 37 C.F.R. pt. 10 (2011).
93.

See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.7 (2011).

94. See id.
R. 5.4.
95. Professor Paul R. Tremblay helpfully addresses issues of delegation to non-lawyers. See
Paul R. Tremblay, Shadow Lawyering: Nonlawyer Practice Within Law Firms, 85 IND. L.J. 653,
680-86 (2010).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2012

13

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 4 [2012], Art. 7

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40:1005

unless one presumes that lawyers are better people and always deserve to
be in control. It is not lawyer bashing to say that no such presumption is
appropriate.
Traditional limits on the practice of law should be acknowledged as
a vestige of a simpler past. Trial lawyers should continue to register with
out-of-state courts before whom they practice and be admitted pro hac
vice,96 but transactional lawyers should not be expected to do anything
comparable. If a lawyer's Dallas client is working on a contract in
Phoenix, the lawyer should be able to fly to Arizona. This may seem
obvious-it is what lawyers do all the time. However, charges of
unauthorized practice are not unprecedented. 97 My point is that the
fundamental concept of state- and even nation-based admission to
practice needs to be reexamined in light of what present and future client
needs are found to be.
Several law firms already have expanded their range of services by
adding law related services ranging from economic consulting to private
investigation to financial management.98 Sometimes the services have
been provided from within the firm; at other times, separate stand-alone
or side-by-side entities have been created.99 A friend of mine who does
estate planning in Virginia has transformed himself and his firm into a
wealth planning enterprise, and he gives investment advice in addition to
drafting wills and trusts. Lawyers in the firm have become licensed
securities dealers and certified financial planners in order to be able to
deliver this total package. I would not be surprised to see other lawyers
and firms take similar steps in their own areas of expertise, and the
question that remains is: why should they not be permitted to partner
with investment advisers and securities dealers rather than getting those
licenses themselves?

96. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.5.

97. The best known recent example of this was Birbrower, Montalbano, Condon & Frank,
P.C. v. Superior Court, in which the California Supreme Court held that a N.Y. law firm could not
collect a fee for representing its client in an arbitration that took place in California. 949 P.2d 1, 3-5,
13 (Cal. 1998). The Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers concluded that a lawyer
may represent, in any jurisdiction, any client who has matters on which the lawyer works in at least
one jurisdiction in which the lawyer is licensed to practice. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 3 (2000). That idea has now found its way into the Model Rules. MODEL
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.5(c)(4) (stating that a lawyer may temporarily deliver legal
services where the lawyer is unlicensed if the services "arise out of or are reasonably related to the
lawyer's practice in a jurisdiction in which the lawyer is admitted to practice").
98. Ted Schneyer, Policymaking and the Perils of Professionalism: The ABA 's Ancillary
Business Debate as a Case Study, 35 ARIZ. L. REv. 363, 367-68 (1993).
99. Once again, Professor Schneyer has written ably about such developments. Id. at 367.
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A decade ago, the report of the ABA Commission on
Multidisciplinary Practice called for revisions in Model Rule 5.4, but
they were defeated.100 The time has come to revisit the rejection of multidisciplinary practice. Multi-service practice organizations are not of
interest only to corporate clients. Social service agencies that want to
provide legal services as part of a package of services to the poor also
have a stake in changing the present rules, and in the United Kingdom,
such smaller entities focused on individual needs have been among the
primary applicants for multi-disciplinary practice status. 01
In late 2011, the ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20 released for
comment a tentative step toward recognizing the role of non-lawyers in
some kinds of representation. 10 2 The District of Columbia has allowed
non-lawyer partners in D.C. firms for many years, 10 3 and under the
tentative ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20 proposal, lawyers would
have been permitted to create similar firms called Alternative Legal
Practice Structures ("ALPS").' 0 4 Non-lawyers could have been members
of such a firm but only if they provided "services that assist the firm in
providing legal services to clients . . . .""o The non-lawyer percentage of

ownership would have been limited, 0 6 and the non-lawyers would have
been required to pass a "fit to own" test. 0 7 But even this proposal was
seen as too radical and the Commission has announced
it will make no
08
such proposal to the ABA House of Delegates.1

100. AM. BAR Ass'N, COMM'N ON ETHICS 20/20, DISCUSSION DRAFT FOR COMMENT:
ALTERNATIVE LAW PRACTICE STRUCTURES REPORT 5 & n. 11 (2011) [hereinafter COMM'N ON

ETHICS 20/20, REPORT], available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/
ethics_2020/20111202-ethics2020-discussion drafl-alps.authcheckdam.pdf;
AM. BAR ASS'N,
COMM'N ON MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES app. A, atAl,

A5-A6 (1999). There have been several fine analyses of the issues presented. See, e.g., Green, supra
note 81, at 1144-56.
101. COMM'N ON ETHICS 20/20, REPORT, supranote 100, at 7-9.
102. See Memorandum from Jamie S. Gorelick & Michael Traynor, Co-Chairs, ABA Cornm'n
on Ethics 20/20, to ABA Entities, Courts, Bar Ass'ns (state, local, specialty, and int'l),
Law Schs., and Individuals 1-3 (Dec. 2, 2011) [hereinafter Memorandum, Gorelick],
available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ethics_2020/20111202ethics202O-discussion-draft-alps.authcheckdam.pdf.
103. D.C. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.4(b) (2007); Memorandum, Gorelick, supra note
102, at 2.
104. COMM'N ON ETHICS 20/20, REPORT, supranote 100, at 5-6.
105. Id. at 5.
106. The proposal would limit the percentage of non-lawyer ownership. Id. at 5-6, 10-11. The
suggested figure of twenty-five percent is bracketed to indicate that states should choose the figure
that seems right to them. Id. at 11.
107. Id. at 5-6, 12 (internal quotation marks omitted). A similar requirement is found in the
new Australian regulations. See Steve Mark, Views From an Australian Regulator, 2009 J. PROF.
LAW. 45, 59-60.
108. Memorandum, Gorelick, supra note 102, at 2.
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In my view, limiting such organizations is ultimately self-defeating.
Although U.S. lawyers are now barred from participating in multidisciplinary firms that deliver legal services in the United States,10 9
American clients can often get the services from firms operating out of
the United Kingdom or Australia, which have each adopted programs
permitting-but registering and regulating-what the British call
"alternative business structures" and the Australians call "incorporated
legal practices."" 0 Up to now, the ABA has acted as though lawyers still
operate in a world in which communication and travel are difficult.
Clients know better. Regulatory regimes should properly continue to
require competent service, protection of privileged information, and
avoidance of conflicts of interest. Blanket prohibition of multidisciplinary firms, however, should no longer be the rule.
C. PermittingRestrictive Covenants
Third, Model Rule 5.6(a)"' should be amended to permit restrictive
covenants designed to impose reasonable restrictions on a lawyer's
changing firms. In the name of not restricting lawyer mobility, Model
Rule 5.6 now prohibits many kinds of financial penalties that firms seek
to use to discourage moving to another practice setting. 112
The traditional argument against such restrictions has been that they
violate a lawyer's professional independence and a client's freedom to
choose its own lawyer." 3 That probably "made sense in a world in which
most lawyers practiced alone. Today, however, relatively few lawyers
are independent; most work within some kind of firm or other
organization, and the financial viability of such firms and organizations
' 14
depends on a reasonably stable number of contributing [partners]." "
In the name of not restricting lawyer mobility, Model Rule 5.6 now
permits a lawyer to leave her current firm with little or no notice, while
109.

See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.4 (2011); COMM'N ON ETHICS 20/20,

REPORT, supra note 100, at 5.
110. Legal Profession Act 2004 (N.S.W.) pt 2.6 div 2 (Austl.); Legal Services Act, 2007,
c. 29, §§ 71-111 (Eng.); see also Memorandum from ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20
Working Group on Alt. Bus. Structures, to ABA Entities, Courts, Bar Ass'ns (state, local,
specialty, and int'l), Law Schs., and Individuals 7-10, 13-14 (Apr. 5, 2011),
available at http://www2.americanbar.org/calendar/110508-201 1-midyear-meeting/Documents/
alternate_structures.pdf (discussing developments in England, Australia, Canada, and Scotland).
111. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.6(a).
112. See id.
113.

See, e.g., Jacob v. Norris, McLaughlin & Marcus, 607 A.2d 142, 148 (N.J. 1992)

("[F]inancial-disincentive provisions may encourage lawyers to give up their clients, thereby
interfering with the lawyer-client relationship and, more importantly, with clients' free choice of
counsel.").
114. MORGAN, supra note 1, at 165.
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at the same time trying to persuade clients to follow the lawyer to a new
firm. 1 5 The Model Rule 6likewise prohibits firms from financially
penalizing such departures.!
One need not argue that lawyers must stay at a firm forever, but
reasonable restrictions on departure could allow firms some financial
security and flexibility in establishing their partnership rules and
compensation structures.' 17 Important as mobility is, firms must contract
for space, hire associates, and develop a reputation that only a degree of
institutional stability permits. 1 8 It can cost law firms competing for top
talent "anywhere from $200,000 to $500,000 to bring a recent law
graduate into the firm as an associate. Nevertheless, at many firms, at
least 40 percent of new hires have voluntarily resigned by the end of
their third year in practice, hardly having made back" the cost the firm
spent to recruit them." 9 Equity will not enforce restrictive covenants that
are excessive in breadth or duration, but there seems120 no good reason to
make lawyer covenants subject to greater restriction.
Ultimately, firms are likely to have to convince young lawyers that
they have a future at the firm that will be attractive over a multi-year
career. Doing so is likely to improve a firm's bottom line. In some cases,
the solution may be part-time work. In other cases, associates need to be
given a sense they are growing in their practice, but requiring lawyers to
spend a given period at a firm after joining it could be an important part
of the process. Some courts have implicitly acknowledged this,
recognizing that persons who make up a law firm should be capable of
reaching arrangements appropriate to their situation. 12 1 Conforming the
Model Rules to the decisions would be a third step in helping firms deal
with the oncoming realities they will face. 122
D. Changes in the Means ofFinancingLaw Practice
Under current rules, lawyers who practice together in a firm may
allocate firm revenues among themselves according to a partnership
agreement or other contract. 123 In a small firm, the senior partner who
115.
116.
also, e.g.,
117.

See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.6(a); MORGAN, supra note 1, at 164-65.
See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.6(a); MORGAN, supra note 1, at 165; see
Cohen v. Lord, Day & Lord, 550 N.E.2d 410,411 (N.Y. 1989).
MORGAN, supra note 1, at 165.

118. See generally Regan, Jr., Law Firms,supranote 41 (discussing law firm stability).
119. MORGAN, supra note 1, at 162.
120. Id. at 165-66.
121. Id. at 166; see also, e.g., Howard v. Babcock, 863 P.2d 150, 160-61 (Cal. 1993);
Shuttleworth, Ruloff& Giordano, P.C. v. Nutter, 493 S.E.2d 364, 367 (Va. 1997).
122. MORGAN, supra note 1, at 166.
123.

See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.4 (2011).
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founded the firm might get fifty percent of all profits, for example, while
in other firms the revenues might be divided according to a formula that
acknowledges who attracted each case as well as who worked on
them. 2 4 Firms typically cover their fixed costs by payments from each
partner or shareholder at the time they join25the firm; those sums are then
returned when the partner leaves the firm.
What firms may not do today is allow non-lawyers to invest in the
law firm. Every jurisdiction in the United States has some form of Model
Rule 5.4(d), 126 which says:
A lawyer shall not practice with or in the form of a professional
corporation or association authorized to practice law for a profit, if: (1)
a nonlawyer owns any interest therein... ; (2) a nonlawyer is a
corporate director or officer thereof or occupies the position of similar
has the right to direct or control
responsibility... ; or (3) a nonlawyer 127
the professional judgment of a lawyer.
This prohibition both denies law firms the ability to raise a
potentially important form of capital and reduces the incentive a firm can
give its members to help build the firm as an effective, ethical institution
that would be attractive to outside investors. Further, if one accepts the
idea that firms should be able to deliver more than legal services and the
idea that restrictive covenants are not anathema, the sale of stock in a
law firm is but a short step. Non-lawyer participation in firm operation
and management will itself involve recognition of the propriety of nonlawyers investing time and sharing the benefits of a firm's potential
success. 128

It is not self-evident that lawyers will want to take in outside
investors. Lawyers who can afford to self-finance will not want to share
earnings with outsiders who will demand a premium for uncertainty. But
many law firms generate significant streams of income, and allowing
lawyers to sell their firms to outside investment would permit existing
lawyers to realize something of the economic value they have created.
They can now do that only by a sale to their remaining partners or to
124. Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 40, at 341-42, 346.
125. Thomas D. Morgan, Should the Public Be Able to Buy Stock in Law Firms?, ENGAGE: J.
FEDERALIST Soc'y PRAC. GROUPS, Sept. 2010, at 111, 111 [hereinafter Morgan, Stock in Law
Firms].
126. Id.
127.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.4(d).

128. Professors Edward S. Adams and John H. Matheson wrote an early article considering
these issues. See generally Edward S. Adams & John H. Matheson, Law Firms on the Big Board:A
Proposalfor Nonlawyer Investment in Law Firms, 86 CALIF. L. REv. 1 (1998) (discussing the issues
resulting from prohibitions against non-lawyer investment in law firms). I have addressed these
issues previously in Morgan, Stock in Law Firms,supra note 125.
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other lawyers. A desire to attract and retain outside investors may also
tend to impose financial discipline on law firms whose members have
perhaps heretofore not had a significant incentive or experienced serious
pressure to exercise it.
There may be three other reasons why outside financing would be
attractive to some law firms.
First, law firms have traditionally not retained much of their income
for future needs. That makes law firms cash poor when the time comes
to make a "long-term investment in new technology, new offices, or to
support an expanded scope of practice., 129 In Australia, Slater & Gordon
used a sale of equity shares to consolidate several offices into larger
ones. It also established reserves with which to finance litigation
expenses between the time a case is filed and the time the fee becomes
payable.130 In the United Kingdom, mid-size firms have expressed a
need for capital with which to expand their ability to use technology to
deliver commodity services to middle-class clients.
Second, non-lawyer investors can help create a liquid market in
firm shares. This can help price goodwill so that departing partners can
realize full value for their contributions to the firm. Successful managers
in other industries receive stock options. "They profit when the company
profits, and they pay taxes at capital gain rates on the increase in their
share value. Lawyers and law firm managers, on the other hand,
basically receive only a pass-through of fees earned that is taxed at high
ordinary-income marginal rates. 13'
Third, non-lawyer investment may build a stronger institutional
character to a law firm, encourage the development of the firm's brand
identity, and build the value of its reputation for ethics and quality:
A law firm's principal assets-its partners and associates-walk out
the firm's door every day, have no obligation to return, and often get
no more or less in return [for] their capital investment if they have
helped the firm prosper or simply get by. In such an environment, even
equity partners have little personal stake in the firn as an institution,
other than not to be left holding the bag if the firm fails. When outside
129. Morgan, Stock in Law Firms, supra note 125, at 111.
130. Id.; see also Investors, SLATER & GORDON, http://www.slatergordon.com.au/investors/
(last visited Nov. 5, 2012).
131. Morgan, Stock in Law Firms, supra note 125, at 111-12. While partnership agreements
vary, U.S. lawyers traditionally have not put a value on the "good will" in their finns, in part
because to do so would imply that firms can be sure that clients will continue to retain it. ABA
Comm. on Prof'l Ethics, Formal Op. 266 (1945). The Professional Ethics Committee put the matter
dramatically: "Clients are not merchandise. Lawyers are not tradesmen. They have nothing to sell
but personal service. An attempt, therefore, to barter in clients, would appear to be inconsistent with
the best concepts of our professional status." Id.
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investors are involved, on the other hand, there are parties with a
genuine stake in the institution's growth and prosperity. And the
incentives flow to the lawyers, as well. The best way to get people to
devote full effort to their law practice may be to give them something
132
tangible to show for their efforts when the time comes to leave.
But if all this is true, why have lawyers so long resisted the idea?
One concern has been that lawyers are client agents and have a fiduciary
duty to focus principal attention on their clients' interests:
Admitting non-lawyer investors to the mix will create a competing
interest in earning a high economic return, the argument goes, thus
potentially compromising the interests of clients or even influencing
the lawyers' professional judgment of how to represent the clients.
A... related concern is that shareholders who are not firm lawyers
will inevitably expect information about the firm and its clients, if only
to measure management success and to predict future firm
performance. Confidential client information is something a lawyer
must keep inviolate. Even a client's identity is normally not public
information and may not be disclosed other than when doing so would
be in the client's interest. Market information, on the other hand, is
essential, and the inherent tension over its release133may seem to place
insurmountable limits on sale of equity securities.
A different concern is that the involvement of non-lawyer investors
would reduce lawyers' willingness to tell clients what the clients [do
not] want to hear. The last time a serious effort was made to bring law
firms into modernity by opening them up to non-lawyer partners, the
Enron scandal broke in which lawyers were accused of turning a blind
eye to wrongdoing by Enron executives. Critics largely ignored the fact
that the Enron events took place under the current regime, not one
involving non-lawyers, but the critics suggested the events might have
turned out even worse if profit-making
rather than client service
34
became a law firm's touchstone.1

132. Morgan, Stock in Law Firms, supra note 125, at 112; see, e.g., Charlotte Edmond, Private
Equity Firm First to Openly Target Legal Services in U.K., LAW.COM (Mar. 6, 2008),
http://www.law.com/jsp/law/LawArticleFriendly.jsp?id--900005560588 (reporting on the plans of
investment house Lyceum Capital, whose advisory board includes Richard Susskind and Tony
Williams). Richard Susskind is the IT advisor to the Lord Chief Justice. About Richard, RICHARD
SUSSKIND, http://www.susskind.com/about.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2012). Tony Williams is the
former director of Andersen Legal, the legal arm of the late Arthur Andersen accounting firm.
People, JOMATI CONSULTANTS LLP, http://jomati.com/people2.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2012).
133. Morgan, Stock in Law Firms, supra note 125, at 112; see also Mark, supra note 107, at
56-58 (describing the challenges of the New South Wales, Australia Legal Services Commissioner
in dealing with this issue).
134. Morgan, Stock in Law Firms, supra note 125, at 112.
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There are good answers to these objections:
First, the idea that only outside investors have a profit motive
ignores the history of large law firms over the last forty years. Profits
have been widely publicized in The American Lawyer and
elsewhere. 135 They have been the lure to attract new lawyers, the
incentive to work evenings and weekends, and the measure of many
lawyers' self-worth. The presence of outside investors may change
how profits are shared but not whether profits are sought.
Second, there is nothing about doing well as a lawyer that inhibits
doing good work for clients or helping them obey the law. Most
clients, most of the time, want help to stay out of trouble, not to figure
out how to violate legal standards. Clients sometimes may want to
move the law in directions that outside observers would not favor, but
that difference in viewpoint neither makes their lawyers less civicminded nor likely
has anything to do with whether a firm has issued
36
equity capital. 1

Third, most of the talk today is about firms seeking private capital
from sophisticated investors rather than selling publicly-traded stock as
Slater & Gordon did. While one could imagine law firms doing the
kind of financial reporting that the [U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission] requires, it would likely be more trouble than it is worth,
and reducing the number of investors actually involved would tend to
reduce the amount of
even non-sensitive client information that would
37
be made available.'

No one knows, of course, whether enough outside investors would
choose to buy law firm stock to make offering it worthwhile. But if not
an idea whose success is inevitable, it is an idea not to be legislated
beyond the realm of possibility.' 38

135. Id; see, e.g., Aric Press & John O'Connor, The Law Firm Investor's Guide, AM. LAW.,
June 2008, at 121 (publishing growth and blue-chip indexes to law firms during the days of high law
firm profitability).
136. Morgan, Stock in Law Firms, supra note 125, at 112. Bruce MacEwen has offered an
imaginative alternative of a derivative security priced to reflect financial performance of the law
firm but would give the security holder no management control. See Bruce MacEwen, Milton C.
Regan, Jr. & Larry Ribstein, Conversation:Law Firms, Ethics, & Equity Capital,21 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHics 61, 65-67 (2008). Professor Milton C. Regan, Jr., is likely correct that those who oppose
outside investment would not be impressed by the distinction, but it is a possible middle ground. Id.
at 67-70.
137. Morgan, Stock in Law Firms, supranote 125, at 112.
138. Id.
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CONCLUSION

The point of this Article has been to call for a response to changes
in the delivery of legal services that I have called the rise of institutional
law practice. I believe the changes are irreversible and constructive. The
logical vehicle for articulating and addressing these changes would be
the ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20, but its response has been
disappointingly modest. 139
Inevitably, institutional law practice is here to stay, and the only
sensible question is how to embrace it and make it better serve the public
interest. That is the insight the United Kingdom and Australia have had
in their moves to register and regulate law practice organizations, in
addition to registering and regulating individual lawyers. 140 While the
new regulatory structure in both countries was initiated by antitrust
authorities rather than the legal profession itself, 14 1 neither the United
Kingdom nor Australia lacks a developed sense of lawyer professional
duty, and practitioners have largely accepted the new regime. 141 We can
learn a lot from their experience, and I believe we should adapt their
insights to the American legal profession at our earliest opportunity.
Until we do so, the ABA is likely to have to consider these issues again
and again until it gets them right.

139. See supra text accompanying notes 100-08.
140. See Legal ProfessionalAct of 2004 (N.S.W.) pt 2.6 div 2 (Austl.); Legal Services Act,
2007, c. 29, §§ 71-111 (Eng.); see also Ted Schneyer, Thoughts on the Compatibilityof Recent U.K
and AustralianReforms with U.S. Traditions in Regulating Law Practice,2009 J. PROF. LAW. 13,

25 [hereinafter Schneyer, Thoughts].
141. Schneyer, Thoughts, supranote 140, at 24-25.
142. See Mark, supra note 107, at 63.
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